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Litigating a
Fair Housing Case
inthe 90s
Edward G. Kramer
Kenneth J. Kowalski

Ensuring equal access to housing for
all Americans is closer to reality with
the passage of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act.

R

ECENT STATUTORY AMENDMENTS to the Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 et

seq. ("Act') will be the impetus for
substantial litigation in this decade.
The Fair Housing Amendments Act
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of 1988 ("Amendments"), which was
enacted on September 13, 1988, and
became effective on March 12, 1989:

tion." The statute defines the term
"residential, real estate-related transaction" to mean any of the following:

Established new protected classes;

"(1) The making or purchasing of
loans or providing other financial assistance (A) for purchasing, constructing,
improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling; or
(B) secured by residential real estate.
(2) The selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property."

* Created an administrative law
judge system to enforce the law; and
e Strengthened many of the original
provisions of the Act.

The addition of new protected classes
increases the already substantial need
for attorneys experienced in litigating
housing discrimination cases.
Many of the litigation strategies
used before the Amendments remain §3605(b). (All section references are
sound today. See Kramer and Ko- to 42 U.S.C. unless otherwise indiwalski, An Overview of FairHousing cated.)
Further, Congress required the SecLitigation (Part 2), 3 The Practical
Real Estate Lawyer 77 (March 1987). retary of the U.S. Department of
This article will review the Amend- Housing and Urban Development
ments, their impact on litigating a fair ("HUD") to report annually on the
housing case, and recent case law in nature and extent of progress in elimithe area.
nating discriminatory housing pracAn important source for the most tices. §3608(e).
recent judicial decisions and adminisThe Amendments also expanded
trative interpretations is Prentice the definition of "discriminatory
Hall's Fair Housing-Fair Lending Re- housing practice" to include coercion,
porter. A monthly bulletin reviewing intimidation, threats, or interference
federal, state and local cases and re- related to a person's exercise of fair
lated matters on fair housing is essen- housing rights. The change in this deftial to keep the litigator on the cutting inition is important in that it elimiedge of this subject.
nates any question that individuals
may file private lawsuits based on section 3617. There were some court deREVIEW OF TIE AMENDMENTS
The Amendments broadened cisions that questioned whether a prithe prohibitions against discrimina- vate right existed. The three most
tory financing by using the term "resi- important Amendments, however, redential, real estate-related transac- late to:

A
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* The changes in the enforcement of
the law;
o Prohibitions of discrimination
against the handicapped; and
* Prohibitions of familial status discrimination.
Amendments
Strengthen Enforcement
The Act created three methods for
its enforcement. The Amendments
established a new administrative procedure to assist in resolving housing
discrimination complaints. Now, the
Secretary ("Secretary") of HUD or the
aggrieved party may file a complaint
within one year of the alleged discrimination. §3610(a).
Administrative Procedure
Under this statutory scheme HUD
has 100 days to conduct an initial investigation. The Secretary can issue
subpoenas and pay witness fees.
§3611 (b). If a party refuses to appear
at the administrative hearing the law
imposes a one-year imprisonment
and up to a $100,000 fine. §3611(c).
During this initial 100 days HUD may
commence conciliation to settle the
dispute. The Secretary must either
dismiss the complaint or file a charge
if the case is not settled through the
conciliation process. §3610(g).
A complainant, respondent, or
other aggrieved party may elect to
have the matter determined in federal
court by notifying HUD within 20
days of the issuing of the charge.
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§3612(a). If a private lawsuit to enforce rights protected by this section is
not filed, the matter will be decided
by an administrative law judge. The
hearing must commence within 120
days of the issuance of the charge. 42
U.S.C. §3612(b), (g)(1).
In December 1989 the first decision
by a HUD administrative law judge
was rendered under this new enforcement scheme. The victim of discrimination was awarded a total of $65,000.
The defendant had to pay an additional $10,000 civil penalty and sell the
house to the black couple at the original contract price of $92,000. HUD v.
Blackwell, No. HUDALJ 04-89-05201 (Heifetz ALJ 12-21-89); V Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Bulletin 1-3
(February 1990). The size of the award
and completeness of the relief granted
are sure to encourage more complainants to use the administrative enforcement avenue to obtain relief.
PrivateLawsuit
Unlike the case of employment discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section
2000e et seq., victims of housing bias
may simply avoid the administrative
process by filing a lawsuit under section 3613. One of the changes under
the amended statute is that a person
can bring a suit within two years of
the alleged discrimination rather than
the previous 180 days. See §3613(a)(1)(A).
The Supreme Court has held that
pre-Amendments section 3613 pro-
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vided an independent remedy that
could be pursued at the same time
HUD was investigating a section 3610
complaint. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109
(1979). It is not likely that this interpretation will change under the
Amendments. Note, however, that
the limitations period is tolled while
HUD administrative proceedings are
pending. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883 E2d 587, 593 (7th Cir. 1989).
Also, under the new law a private
lawsuit is barred if the case has already started before the administrative law judge. See §3613(a)(3).
Lawsuit by Attorney General
The last method of enforcement is
the institution of litigation by the Attorney General of the United States.
§3614. To file a lawsuit under the previous provisions the Justice Department had to prove that a "pattern or
practice" of housing discrimination
was occurring that raised "an issue of
"
general public importance. . ...
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co.,
Inc., 484 E2d 438,444 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). For
an excellent discussion on the legislative history of this phrase, see United
States v. Mitchell, 327 E Supp. 476,
480-83 (N.D. Georgia 1971).
Now the Attorney General can also
institute suit in non-pattern-andpractice cases that are referred by
HUD.Under the amended provision
the Justice Department must bring an
action based on cases referred by

HUD within 18 months from the alleged discrimination. §3614(b)(1)(B).
Also, now the federal Government is
subject to a statute of limitations for
bringing this action. This was not the
case under the original statute. United
States v. Sommerlin, 310 U.S. 414
(1940); United States v. Mitchell, supra, at 485.
The Justice Department filed its
first lawsuits under the Amendments
on March 13, 1989, the date the law
took effect. Both cases involved alleged practices of property owners or
managers that expressed limitations,
preferences, and other discriminatory
choices based on race. US. v. Klinker,
Case No. 4-89-CIV-210 (D.Minnfiled
3-13-89); U.S. v. Rent America, Inc.,
Case No. 89-6188-CIV-Paine (S.D.
Fla. filed 3-13-89); IV Fair HousingFair Lending Bulletin 4-5 (May 1989)
Handicapped Discrimination
The Act now defines a person with
disabilities as one who:
"(1) [has] aphysical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
acmore of such person's major life
tivities,
(2)[has] a record of having such an
impairment, or
(3)[is]
regarded as having such an impairment,
but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a
controlled substance...."§3602(h).
final rules to interpret "ImpleInits
mentation of the Fair Housing

HeinOnline -- 1 Prac. Litig. 44 1990

1990

LITIGATING A FAIR HOUSING CASE

Amendments Act of 1988," 54 FR.
3232, 3245 (January 23, 1989), HUD
cited the legislative history as requiring a liberal interpretation of the term
"handicap." This interpretation
would include individuals with the
AIDS virus or tuberculosis, alcoholics, the mentally ill, and former
drug abusers. However, nothing in
the statute requires that a person rent
or sell property to a handicapped person who would "constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other
individuals or whose tenancy would
result in substantial physical damage
to the property of others."
§3604(f)(9). See 24 C.ER. §100.201
(1989).
Reasonable Modification
The law does require that a handicapped person be able to rent if reasonable modifications to the existing
dwelling would permit the individual
to reside there and he pays for the
modification. §3604(f)(3)(A). See
also 24 C.ER. §100.204 (1989). For
example, if a blind prospective tenant
could live in the rental property by
having a seeing eye dog, the apartment's rule prohibiting pets cannot be
used to deny this handicapped person
the right to rent the unit.
Accessibility of
Mutifamily Dwellings
The Amendments also make it unlawful to make multifamily dwellings
inaccessible to persons with handicaps if they are to be occupied for the
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first time after March 13, 1991.
§3604(f)(3)(C). The exact requirements necessary to meet this obligation have not yet been determined.
HUD has requested comments from
the public before adopting a substantive regulation for this area.
Preemption
Note that the statute specifically
denies a federal preemption claim.
The law states that "[n]othing in this
subchapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a State or
political subdivision of a State, or
other jurisdiction in which this title
shall be effective, that requires dwellings to be designed and constructed in
a manner that affords handicapped
persons greater access than is required
by this title." §3604(f)(8).
Inquiring About Handicaps
Landlords or real estate agents are
limited in what they can ask about a
person's handicap. They cannot ask
about the nature or severity of a
handicap, nor inquire about whether
some person associated with the
buyer or potential tenant is handicapped. However, HUD has indicated that the following inquiries can
be made as long as all applicants are
asked the same questions:
a Whether the applicant can meet the
requirements of ownership or tenancy;
* Whether an applicant is qualified
for a dwelling available only to per-
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sons with handicaps or to persons
with a particular type of handicap;
* Whether an applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a priority available
to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap;
* Whether an applicant for a dwelling is a current illegal abuser or addict
of a controlled substance; and
* Whether an applicant has been
convicted of the illegal manufacture
or distribution of a controlled substance. 24 C.ER. §100.202(c) (1989).
Handicap DiscrintnLitigation
To determine whether the evidence
of handicap discrimination makes a
prima facie case, you must apply the
standard of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973):
* The complainant is handicapped as
defined in the statute;
* The complainant was a qualified
prospective buyer or tenant;
o The complainant was denied the
rental unit or home; and
* When applicable, the unit was later
rented or sold to a non-handicapped
person. QuakerHill Placev. StateHuman Relations Commission, 498 A.2d
175, 183 (Del. Super. 1985).
Effect on Zoning Ordinaces
The most significant effect of the
handicapped discrimination prohibition may well be on local zoning ordi-

nances. Although the Amendments
do not specifically prohibit zoning
laws that prevent handicapped housing, they do make it illegal to discriminate "in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of" the buyer's or renter's handicapping condition, or "the handicapping condition of any person
associated with the buyer or renter."
42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1). Courts have in
the past determined that this language
applies to zoning regulations, and the
legislative history supports this interpretation. U.S. Code Congressional
and Administrative News, No. 8,
p.2185 (November 1988).
The law has already been used successfully to attack a city's refusal to issue a special permit to allow the remodeling of an existing building to
house AIDS patients. The developer
was able to obtain injunctive relief ordering the community to take the necessary action to permit the remodeling
of the facility. Baxter v. City of Belleville, fi., 720 E Supp. 720 (S.D. Ill
1989). Also, the U.S. Department of
Justice has filed a lawsuit against a
community that had refused to permit
the construction of a group home for
15 mentally retarded adults based on
the amended Act. U.S. v. Chicago
Heights, Case No. 89 C 4938 (N.D.Ill.
filed 6-20-89); IV Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Bulletin 3-5 (August 1989)
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Familial Status Now Protected
The Amendments added protection against discrimination for families with children, prohibiting discrinination in the sale or rental of
housing because of "familial status."
This generally means the presence of
children under 18. §3607(k).
The Department of Justice has
filed several lawsuits alleging familystatus discrimination. The first case,
U.S. v. LaFongeAssociates, Case No.
89-1729 (D.N.J. filed 4-18-89) was
settled for $33,000 within two months
of filing. IV Fair Housing-Fair Lending Bulletin 18 (August 1989) For a
more comprehensive review of both
the legislative history and possible legal impact see Comment, The Fair
HousingAmendments Act of 1988: A
Critical Analysis of "FamilialStatus;
54 Mo. L. Rev. 393 (1989).
"Housingfor Older
Persons"Exempted
However, the Act provides an exemption from this prohibition for
housing which qualifies as "housing
for older persons." §3607(b). The statutory definition of "housing for older
persons" comprises three categories of
housing:
* Housing provided under any state
or federal program that is specifically
designed and operated to assist elderly
persons, as determined by the Secretary of HUD;
9 Housing intended for, and solely
occupied by, persons 62 or older; and
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e Housing intended for and occupied
by at least one person 55 years of age
or older per unit, provided certain criteria, spelled out in 24 C.ER. Part
100.34 (1989) are met.
Simply labeling an apartment complex or housing development as housing for senior citizens will not be
enough. To merit the exemption, the
housing will have to be either:
* Solely intended for, and occupied
by, persons over 62; or
* Intended and operated for occupancy by at least one person over 55
per unit.
To meet the latter requirement, 80 per
cent of the units must have at least one
resident over 55. In addition the complex must provide significant facilities
and services specifically designed to
meet the needs of older persons or
demonstrate that it is not practicable to
provide such services and demonstrate
that the housing facility is necessary to
provide important housing opportunities for older persons.
The legislative history of the
amendments indicates that these exceptions are to be narrowly construed. 134 Cong. Rec. H6498 (daily
ed. August 8, 1988)
Housing that did not meet the requirements for housing for older persons as of the date of enactment of the
Amendments could still qualify as long
as new occupants of that housing meet
the age requirements. §3607(b)(3).
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press congressional deference to state
Restrictions on Number
and local guidelines. The agency
of Occupants Exempted
The other significant exemption in- noted that while HUD promulgated
volves restrictions on the number of occupancy standards for use by parpersons permitted to occupy a dwell- ticipants in HUD housing programs,
ing unit. The Amendments do not these guidelines may not be reasonlimit the applicability of any reason- able for other dwellings.
As indicated in HUD's interpretaable local, state, or federal restrictions
regarding the maximum number of tion of the occupancy standards exoccupants per dwelling unit. emption, the word that will probably
§3607(b)(1). This provision is in- generate litigation in connection with
tended to allow reasonable govern- this exemption is "reasonable."
Occupancy restrictions instituted
mental limitations on occupancy to
continue in effect as long as they are by a private owner or manager of
applied to all occupants and do not dwellings in the absence of any state
operate to discriminate on a prohib- or local occupancy code should be
ited basis. See H.R. Report No. 711, subject to greater scrutiny. First of all,
there is the question of whether a pri100th Congress, 2d Sess. 31 (1988).
This exemption will not automati- vate party can take advantage of the
cally save all zoning restrictions. For exemption at all in such a situation.
instance, in Doe v. City of Butler, 892 The statute only mentions "local,
E2d 315 (3d Cir. 1989), the Third Cir- state or federal restrictions" and does
cuit remanded for more thorough not seem to make provision for an
consideration a claim that a city's six- owner of, for example, a mobile
person limit on transitional housing home park to promulgate occupancy
would adversely affect battered limits when there are no state or local
women seeking shelter because the restrictions. How the courts answer
limit would make it difficult for this question remains to be seen.
women with children to use transiHUD has indicated that, at least as
tional dwellings.
far as it is concerned, in appropriate
Comments to the regulations first circumstances owners and managers
proposed by HUD to implement the may develop and implement reasonnew Amendments raised questions able occupancy requirements based
about this exemption. Some urged on factors such as number of sleeping
HUD to determine what occupancy rooms and the overall size of the unit.
standards could be applied to sale or HUD goes on to say that it will carerental of dwellings, even to the extent fully examine such privately promulof developing a national occupancy gated restrictions to determine if they
standard. This HUD declined to do, unreasonably exclude families with
interpreting the Amendments to ex- children.
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You may find guidance on likely ju- tions of an apartment complex availdicial interpretations by reviewing de- able to minorities. See, e.g., United
cisions of state courts involving seem- States v. Starrett City Assoc., 660 F
ingly conflicting provisions of the new Supp. 668 (E.D. N.Y. 1987), aff'd,
federal Amendments and state laws. 840 E2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. deFor instance, the California Supreme nied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1989); United
Court recently held that the ability of States v. Mitchell, 580 E2d 789 (5th
a mobile home park to bar adults un- Cir. 1978).
der the age of 25, as allowed by California law, was not affected by the S EGHON 1981 AND 1982 L1TIGAION 0
Amendments. Schmidt v. Superior
Two statutes often used in conCourt of Santa Barbara County 48
junction with the Act were enacted
Cal. 3d 370, 256 Cal. Rptr. 750, 769 soon after the Civil War. One of these
P.2d 932 (1989). Thus, it would seem concerned the right of a citizen to own
that discrimination against persons and control property. That section,
over 18 would not be prohibited.
now codified at section 1982, proIf there is a conflict between the vides that all citizens shall have the
federal Act and a state law, however, same right as enjoyed by white citithe Act controls.
zens to "inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal
Definition of "Dweling"
The definition of "dwelling" is ex- property"
In 1870, Congress passed another
tremely broad and essentially covers
civil rights act to further extend to nonall housing:
white citizens the rights of citizenship.
* Apartments or other rental units;
This broader act provided that "all per" Single family housing;
sons. . . have the same right. .,. to
make and enforce contracts . . to the
" Cooperatives;
full and equal benefit of all laws and
" Condominiums; and
proceedings for the security of persons
" Mobile home parks.
and property as is enjoyed by white cit.. " These laws received relaHousing providers should also be ize..
aware that the prohibition against tively little attention until the landmark
refusing to rent to families with chil- U.S. Supreme Court decision Jones v.
dren will almost certainly be inter- Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The Court
preted to forbid the formerly com- held that section 1982 prohibited both
mon practice of segregating units by public and private discrimination in
age or family status. The courts have the sale or rental of property. The
consistently outlawed the practice of Court further held that the statute was
limiting the number or particular sec- a valid exercise of congressional power
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der section 1981 for racially discriminatory discharge. Since the decision in
Patterson there have been decisions
both affirming and denying that section 1981 protects employees from racially discriminatory firings.
Birdwhistle v. Kansas Power and
Light Co., 723 F. Supp. 570 (D.C.
Kan. 1989); Booth v. Terminix International Inc., 722 E Supp. 675 (D.
Kan. 1989); Padilla v. United Air
Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo.
The PattersonCase
The U.S. Supreme Court in Patter- 1989). Cf. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co.,
son v. McLean Credit Union, 109 885 E2d 1305, 1312 (7th Cir. 1989).
S.Ct. 2363 (1989), found that a suit Contra Thompson v. Johnson Mgmt.
against an employer claiming racial Information Center 725 E Supp. 826,
harassment did not state a valid claim 827 (D.N.J. 1989).
under section 1981. The rationale was
Until a Circuit Court or the Suthat section 1981 did not apply to preme Court rules on the subject a
claim should still be raised for racially
post-formation contract situations.
discriminatory or retaliatory evictions
Effect on Lower Court Decisions
under section 1981. However, you
It is uncertain what effect, if any, should still be aware of the protecPatterson may have on lower court tions accorded non-white citizens by
decisions holding that section 1981 section 1982. The language of this
furnishes a cause of action for racially statute differs substantially from that
retaliatory evictions of tenants. Jus- of section 1981. Further, the rights imtice Kennedy, who wrote the 5-4 ma- plicated by section 1982 are not just
jority opinion in Patterson, affirmed contractual, but instead deal with the
the importance of section 1981. "The right to own, lease, or hold property.
law now reflects society's consensus Thus Patterson should have no effect
that discrimination based on the color on it. On this reasoning a racially disof one's skin is a profound wrong of criminatory eviction, since it denies
tragic dimension." Id. at 2379. This the right to "hold . . . property,"
type of language does not support a would arguably still be actionable unnarrow interpretation of the law.
der section 1982.
Finally, the effect of the Patterson
It is interesting that the Fourth Circuit decision in Patterson v. McLean decision is also limited in fair housing
Credit Union, 805 E2d 1143, 1145 litigation except when the Act's ex(4th Cir. 1986), supports a claim un- emptions might prevent bringing a
under the thirteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
These statutes were used extensively to overcome the limitations of
the Act in the areas of punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Since the
Amendments and recent case law permit punitive damages and attorneys'
fees these statutes may be of limited
use to plaintiffs.
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suit. This would occur when the
owner of the property in question is
exempted under section 3603.

f

ROVING INTENT a Noticeably ab-

sent from the Amendments is any
indication as to whether a showing of
intent is necessary to prove a violation
of the Act. Under the most common
theory of proving a fair housing violation, the disparate treatment theory,
the plaintiff will attempt to show that
her treatment by the defendant was
caused by a prohibited motive.
Plaintiffs have successfully used
another theory in a number of fair
housing cases. It is known as the disparate impact or discriminatory effects theory. Under this theory a
plaintiff may succeed in proving a violation without proof of discriminatory intent. The underpinning for this
theory is that the Act was meant to
outlaw practices that result in excluding members of protected classes regardless of the motivation behind the
practice. The use of this theory or
some variant has been upheld consistently by the federal courts of appeals.
See, e.g., Huntington Branch
NAACP v. The Town of Huntington,
844 E2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 109S.
Ct. 276 (1988); Betsey v. Thrtle Creek
Associates, 736 E2d 983 (4th Cir.
1984); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782
E2d 565 (6th Cir. 1986).
The disparate impact or effects theory was adopted from litigation involving employment discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
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of 1964, §2000e et seq. Because of the
similarity between some of the language and, more importantly, the
goals of Title VII and the language
and goals of the Act, the courts have
freely borrowed from Title VII precedent in analyzing fair housing cases.
Schwartz, The Fair Housing Act and
"DiscriminatoiyEffecth: A New Perspective, 11 Nova L. Rev. 71 (1986).
The Elements of DisparateImpact
Under disparate impact, if a plaintiff can present evidence that a policy
has a greater adverse impact on a protected class of persons or perpetuates
segregation, the defendant must then
prove that the policy is justified by an
important and rational business reason. Betsey v. Tirtle Creek Associates,
736 E2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
Effect of Wards Cove Decision
Since the disparate impact or effects
test is so closely modeled on Title VII
law, the Supreme Court's decision last
term in the case of Ward's Cove v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), which
changed the ground rules for Title VII
disparate impact cases, might affect
fair housing disparate impact cases. In
Ward's Cove the Court first held that
plaintiffs attempting to show the discriminatory impact of a hiring policy
must be specific and show what particular part of the selection procedure adversely affected the plaintiffs. It is no
longer sufficient to simply point to a
disparity in the work force. The court
then went on to hold that once the
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plaintiff does establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact, the defendant must only meet a burden of
production-not proof-of evidence
that the policy in question was justified
by a substantial business reason.
Although the effects of the Ward's
Cove decision on future employment
litigation are difficult to predict, it is
even harder to assess the decision's
likely effect on fair housing cases. The
Court's pronouncement on the specificity necessary to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case will probably
not make a great difference in fair
housing cases since plaintiffs in fair
housing cases can almost always readily identify a specific policy which is
causing a disparate impact. Almost
all disparate impact fair housing cases
concern a single policy which results
in the disparate impact.
In employment cases the question
of whether a justification put forward
by the employer for the discrinminatory policy is adequate may be a close
one. Thus the burden of proof issue
would be crucial to the outcome. In
fair housing cases, however, the justification offered by a housing provider
for a policy that adversely affects a
protected group is not usually as complex. A clear-cut decision as to the validity of the justification will be easier
to reach. Thus, whatever the burden
of proof on the housing provider once
the disparate impact is shown, it is not

likely that the litigation strategies of
the parties nor the decision of the
court would vary.
Beware of Rule 11 Sanctions
You must be sensitive to attacks
based on the filing of frivolous lawsuits or pleadings. Fed.R.Civ. P. 11.
The increased willingness of federal
courts to sanction attorneys for filing
pleadings for an improper purpose,
or to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increased litigation costs is now
a serious concern for civil rights lawyers. Good faith filing is no defense.
In at least one instance, the fact that
HUD had administratively found that
discrimination had occurred was sufficient to deny Rule 11 sanctions. The
court had dismissed the lawsuit and
the successful defendant had requested
$14,000 for the cost of the litigation.
Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 883
E2d 587 (7th Cir. 1989). The district
court had found that HUD's investigation, not vexatious intent, had been the
catalyst to the suit. It therefore refused
to impose sanctions on the plaintiffs or
their counsel.

C ONCLUSION*

The Amendments
to the Fair Housing Act offer opportunities to promote equal access to
housing for millions of Americans.
Litigators will play an important role
in obtaining the necessary judicial interpretations to translate the objectives of the Act into reality.
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